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Abstract
We compare the effects of the three most common ATM pricing regimes on con-
sumers’ welfare and banks’ profits. We consider cases where the ATM usage is free,
where customers pay a foreign fee to their bank and where they pay a foreign fee and
a surcharge. Paradoxically, when banks set an additional fee profits are decreased.
Besides, consumers’ welfare is higher when ATM usage is not free. Surcharges enhance
ATM deployment so that consumers prefer paying surcharges when reaching cash is
costly. Our results also shed light on the Australian reform that consists in removing
the interchange fee.
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In most countries, banks share their automated teller machines (hereafter ATMs): a
cardholder affiliated to a bank can use an ATM of another bank and make a “foreign with-
drawal”. This transaction generates two types of monetary transfers. At the wholesale level,
the cardholder’s bank pays an interchange fee to the ATM-owning bank. It is a compensa-
tion for the costs of deploying the ATM and providing the service. This interchange system
exists in most places where ATMs are shared.1 At the retail level, the pricing of ATM usage
varies considerably across countries and periods. In the United Kingdom or France, banks
do not levy any usage fee. In Australia, consumers pay a “foreign fee” to their bank when
they use an ATM of another bank. In the USA, cardholders using an ATM of another bank
pay two separate fees: a foreign fee to their bank and a “surcharge” to the ATM-owning
bank.
There have been substantial debates about the pricing of ATM networks since the be-
ginning of the 90s. There are two main issues. At the wholesale level, banks choose the
level of the interchange fee jointly in most countries. Some economists have argued that
this level could be reflected in the ATM usage fees or the account fee so that banks may
use the collective setting at the wholesale level to relax price competition at the retail level
(see the Cruickshank report (2000) for the UK, Balto (2000) for the USA, Donze & Dubec
(2006) for France). Several attempts have been made to limit the possibility of collusion: in
Australia and South Africa, regulation authorities have studied the possibility to replace the
interchange system by a “direct charging regime” in which each bank charges a single ATM
usage fee to non customers using its ATMs (see Reserve Bank of Australia & the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) ; Competition Commission of South Africa
(2007)).
At the retail level, consumers have been reluctant to pay ATM usage fees. It is especially
1Banks also pay the network a switch fee per foreign transaction and an annual membership fee to cover
its costs.
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true in the USA where cardholders generally have to pay a foreign fee and a surcharge
for using an ATM not operated by their bank.2 This “double charging” makes foreign
withdrawals quite expensive (around 3$ in 2006, see Hayashi, Sullivan, Weiner (2006)) ; and
consumers’ associations have argued against surcharges, since interchange fees are already
charged to compensate banks for processing foreign withdrawals. On the other hand, banks
and independent ATM deployers claim that the introduction of surcharging in 1996 has
allowed them to deploy more ATMs and thus has facilitated access to cash. Evidence shows
that ATM deployment has been much faster from 1996.3 Nowadays, the USA and Canada
have much more ATMs per inhabitant than countries in which surcharging is not applied.4
Banks’ profits have also been affected by this change. Indeed, the larger number of ATMs and
rising surcharges have induced a sharp fall in transactions per machine, notably the foreign
acquired transactions that generate revenues in the form of surcharges and interchange fees.5
The revenues per ATM have fallen and recent studies show that on average banks tend to
2In Great Britain in 1999, consumer anger over an attempt by several banks to introduce ATM surcharges
was so strong that the banks have not only abandoned their surcharge plans but also eliminated existing
ATM foreign fees.
3After growing at an annual rate of 10.2 percent from 1991 to 1996, the number of ATMs increased at an
annual rate of 19.7 percent between 1996 and 2001, and 4.1 percent between 2001 and 2006. This made the
number of ATMs grow from 139000 in 1996 to 324000 in 2001 and 395000 in 2006 (Hayashi, Sullivan, and
Weiner (2006)).
4In 2006 in the USA, there are 1312 ATMs per million inhabitants and in Canada: 1666 ATMs per
million inhabitants. In both countries, cardholders pay foreign fees and surcharges. These figures have to be
compared with the 1007 ATMs per million inhabitant in the United Kingdom or the 741 ATMs per million
inhabitant in France. In both countries, usually banks do not charge ATM usage. The difference between
France and the UK comes from the existence of independent ATM deployers in the UK (43% of the total
ATM network in 2006).
5In the USA, the monthly transactions per ATM declined from 6400 in 1996 to 3500 in 2001, and 2130
in 2006.
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lose money on their ATMs.6
In this paper we study how the ATM pricing scheme affects the ATM deployment, con-
sumers’ welfare and banks’ profits. We address the following questions: Does the collective
setting of the interchange fee favor collusion ? Should the interchange fee be abandoned in
favor of direct charging as proposed by the Australian Competition Commission ? Do ATM
usage fees harm or enhance consumers’ welfare?
To answer these questions, we develop a model where two horizontally differentiated
banks first choose the interchange fee jointly and then deploy ATMs and compete for depos-
itors non cooperatively. We compare three regimes of retail ATM pricing. In each regime
consumers pay a fixed account fee to join a bank. Under regime one, cardholders can freely
access to all ATMs of the shared network (ATM usage fees are nil). Under regime two,
cardholders pay a foreign fee per foreign withdrawal to their bank. Under regime three, they
pay a foreign fee to their bank and a surcharge to the ATM-owning bank.
In our framework, consumers need a fixed amount of cash in a shopping space, that can
range from a concentrated to a sprawling area. For a given number of ATMs, the average
travel cost to withdraw cash is higher in a wider shopping space and consequently consumers’
valuation of an additional machine is higher. The parameter reflecting the dispersion of the
shopping space will play an important role in the comparison of consumers’ welfare across
the different regimes.
We find that the size of the shared network is sensitive to the pricing regime. Under
regime one, the ATM usage is free and hence all ATMs are identical for consumers. In this
case banks deploy ATMs not to attract new depositors but rather to generate interchange
revenues. Under regime two and three, foreign withdrawals are not free and the two networks
6According to the ATM deployer study 2006 (Dove, 2007), deployers earned an average of $1,104 per
month at their on-premise ATMs, and $1,013 at their off-premise ATMs. On the spending side, deployers
incurred average monthly expenses of $1,444 per on-premise ATM, and $1,450 per off-premise ATM.
4
are differentiated by usage fees: consumers prefer a bank with a large ATM network in order
to make less foreign withdrawals. In this case each bank can increase its share of deposits
by deploying more ATMs. We show that for a given interchange fee, this differentiation
effect of ATM usage fees leads banks to deploy more ATMs under regime two than under
regime one. In general the network is even larger under regime three: for a given interchange
fee, surcharging increases the revenue per non-customer’s withdrawal above the interchange
fee. Consequently banks are even more eager to open ATMs to attract foreign withdrawals.
This result could explain the difference in the number of ATMs per inhabitant observed
between the USA and Canada, under regime three, and the United Kingdom and France,
under regime one.
Paradoxically, for a given interchange fee consumers’ welfare is larger when they pay
foreign fees (regime two) than when ATM usage is free (regime one) while the opposite is true
for banks’ profits. As noted before, more ATMs are deployed under regime two which benefits
consumers but increases deployment costs. Banks’ pricing strategy reinforces this effect on
surpluses and profits. Indeed, when ATM usage is free, cardholders make “many” foreign
withdrawals which generates a large gross surplus that banks extract through the account
fee. With the unitary foreign fees, consumers adjust the demand for foreign withdrawals
downward and pay less to their bank.
Another striking result is that when banks set the interchange fee at the joint-profit
maximizing level, profits are highest under regime one, and lowest under regime three. When
surcharges are prohibited, equilibrium profits depend on the interchange fee, so that banks
can use the interchange fee as a collusive device. This possibility is especially profitable for
banks under regime one because they can generate and extract a large consumers’ surplus as
explained above. Regime three is the worst for banks for two reasons: first, the deployment
costs are very high. Second, we show that the interchange fee does not affect banks’ profits
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anymore so that collusion is impossible.7 Under regime three banks lose money on average
on their ATMs, which is consistent with evidence presented earlier.
We also compare the consumers’ surpluses at the profit-maximizing interchange fee. We
show that banks can extract all consumer surplus under regime one. This is not the case when
usage fees are levied. As noted before more ATMs are deployed under regime three than
under regime two and consequently, consumers benefit from a better but more expensive
service. We show that consumers prefer regime three to regime two when the dispersion
parameter is high enough. In this case, accessing to a machine is more costly and consumers
highly value each additional ATM: they are ready to pay for the large ATM network of
regime three. When the shopping space is more concentrated, consumers are satisfied with
the smaller but less expensive network of regime two. The importance of travel costs in
comparing consumers’ welfare is consistent with evidence. Knittel and Stango (2008a) use
the regime change of 1996 (from regime two to three) as a “before and after experiment” to
study the impact of the ATM pricing on ATM deployment and consumers’ welfare. They
find that “consumers in high travel cost counties experience substantially higher welfare after
1996, while the net effect remains negative for consumers in low travel cost counties” (p 24).
Our paper is the first theoretical work justifying the importance of travel cost in the welfare
comparison.
At the regulatory level, we show that the “direct charging scheme” where the interchange
fee is suppressed and where customers pay a unique ATM usage fee to the ATM-owning bank
is equivalent to regime three. This comes from the irrelevance of the interchange fee under
regime three. In this case, ATM usage fees distort competition on the deposit market and
banks deploy so many ATMs that they lose money on each machine.
Our analysis highlights the interactions between the “withdrawal market” and the deposit
7The “neutrality” of the interchange fee when surcharges are allowed was first informally stated by Salop
(1990).
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market: in our model consumers’ choice of where to open an account is endogenous and
depends on the account fees, on the number of ATMs deployed by each bank and on the
ATM usage fees. Empirical works have shown that all three elements matter. Ishii (2006) and
Knittel and Stango (2008a) find that when banks levy usage fees, the relative size of banks’
ATM networks has a significant impact on consumers’ decisions where to bank. Massoud,
Saunders and Scholnick (2006) find that increasing surcharges give customers some incentives
to switch accounts from smaller banks to larger banks in order to avoid high usage fees.
Our work is also related to an extensive theoretical literature on ATM pricing (see McAn-
drews (2003) for a survey). Donze and Dubec (2006) focus attention to regime one and show
the collusive role of the interchange fee. We extend this model by considering a more gen-
eral demand for withdrawals. Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) consider a framework without
interchange fees in which banks impose surcharges on non depositors. ATM deployment is
exogenous. They show that banks set high surcharges for non customers in order to rise
the cost of foreign withdrawals for these customers and hence to become more attractive.
This indirect effect of surcharging on the deposit market also exists in our framework under
regime three. Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis and Santamaria (2006) compare regimes two
and three. To keep tractability, they ignore the effect of ATM usage fees on consumers’
decisions where to open an account. They also show that banks’ profits are higher under
regime two than under regime three when banks set the interchange fee at its maximizing
level. Nevertheless our results differ concerning the effect of surcharges on consumers’ wel-
fare. Chioveanu et al find that consumers are always better off when surcharges are allowed.
In their model, the shopping space consists in several malls where banks install machines.
Consumers are infinitely sensitive to travel costs to withdraw cash in the sense that they are
never willing to go to another mall to find a machine of their bank. Hence, in some way,
their model corresponds to the situation in which our dispersion parameter is high.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds up the model. Section 3 studies the
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regime where there is no ATM usage fee (regime one). Sections 4 and 5 examine the regimes
with foreign fees (regime two) and foreign fees plus surcharges (regime three). Section 6
compares the welfare across regimes and studies the effect of suppressing the interchange
fee. Section 7 concludes.
1 The model
We use the Hotelling framework. Two banks are located at the two ends of a linear product
space of length 1. Consumers of banking services are distributed uniformly along this product
space. Their number is normalized to one. Consumers do their shopping and withdraw
money in another space, which we refer to as the shopping space. We assume that within
this space, consumers’ location is uniform at any time when they need of cash. Furthermore,
the commercial activity and the total amount of cash withdrawn per cardholder are fixed.
However the shopping space can be more or less spread out. It is a shortcut to take into
account travel costs to reach cash in the analysis. We will return to this point later.
Banks
They provide two kinds of services: (i) basic banking services (deposit management,
possibility to withdraw cash at the bank’s branch office,...) and (ii) access to a network of
compatible ATMs. The number of ATMs deployed by bank i is ni and the total number
of ATMs is n = n1 + n2. As the measure of consumers is one, n is a number of ATMs per
consumer and 1 is clearly an upper bound for n. We assume that each bank uniformly deploys
its ATMs in the shopping space since each bank’s cardholders are uniformly distributed
when they need cash. The cost of deploying and operating an ATM is denoted by c.8 The
8This cost is annual and includes the purchase costs of the machine (depreciated over approximatively
five years), installation, site rental, repairs and maintenance, cleaning, communication costs, cash delivery
and replenishment, insurance and security, and the opportunity cost of the cash in the machine.
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marginal cost of providing the basic services is constant and denoted by cb. The marginal
cost of processing a withdrawal is independent from the affiliation of the cardholder and it
is normalized to zero. When a cardholder of bank i makes a withdrawal at an ATM of bank
j, bank i pays an interchange fee, a, to bank j.
Bank i sets an account fee pi for its cardholders. There are two possible ATM usage fees
fi and si: bank i charges its own cardholders a foreign fee fi for each withdrawal made at
an ATM of bank j (foreign withdrawal). Bank i charges cardholders of bank j a usage fee
si (referred to as “surcharge”) when they use one of its ATMs. As usually observed, banks
do not charge their cardholders for domestic withdrawals. We will consider three pricing
regimes: under regime one, there is no ATM usage fees: fi = si = 0. Under regime two, only
surcharges are prohibited: si = 0. Under regime three, all ATM usage fees are allowed.
Consumers
A consumer gets zero surplus when he does not bank. To become a cardholder of bank
i located at a distance δi in the product space, a consumer must pay the account fee pi to
the bank. In this case, the consumer obtains a total surplus equal to:
wi = vb − tδi + vi − pi (1)
The first term vb is the fixed surplus from consuming basic services. The second term tδi is
a differentiation cost in the product space (where t > 0). Parameters vb, cb and t have the
following properties:
Assumption 1. (i) t is “sufficiently large” and (ii) vb − cb ≥ 3t/2.
Assumption 1(i) is necessary for the second order conditions of the profit maximization
to be verified. Assumption 1(ii) guarantees that consumers want to affiliate to a bank even
if there is no ATM. To ensure the existence of equilibria, vb, cb and t must satisfy extra
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conditions described later. The third term of expression (1), vi, corresponds to the variable
net surplus from “consuming” withdrawals. More precisely,
vi = ui(ni, nj, q
d
i , q
f
i )− (fi + sj)qfi (2)
where qdi (respectively q
f
i ) is the number of domestic (respectively foreign) withdrawals made
by a cardholder of bank i.
To keep the model tractable, we do not explicitly model the micro behavior of con-
sumers when they choose an ATM. Instead, in appendix 1 we specify a surplus function
ui(ni, nj, q
d
i , q
f
i ) generating the “reasonable” individual demands for withdrawals that follow:
qdi (ni, nj, di, fi + sj) = α
ni
n
nγ + β′(fi + sj) (3)
and
qfi (ni, nj, di, fi + sj) = α
nj
n
nγ − β(fi + sj) (4)
with α > 0, β > β′ ≥ 0 and γ ∈ [0, 0.39].9
To justify the shape of the demands, let us first consider the case where usage fees, fi, sj,
are equal to zero. In this case, consumers withdraw cash regardless of the ATM owner. The
total number of withdrawals per cardholder, qdi + q
f
i , is equal to αn
γ. For a given positive
γ, the total number of withdrawals per cardholder is increasing in n. We have in mind a
justification a` la Allais (1947) - Baumol (1952) - Tobin (1956): consumers trade off the costs
(the forgone interests) and the benefits (avoiding a trip to an ATM) to hold cash. A larger
ATM network reduces the distance to reach a machine, benefits to hold cash decrease and
consumers make more withdrawals. However each extra machine reduces the distance less
and less so that the number of withdrawals increases slower than the number of ATMs: the
number of withdrawals per machine is decreasing in the network size.
Parameter α is a scale parameter. Parameter γ reflects the spread of the shopping space.
As n < 1, the total number of withdrawals αnγ is decreasing in γ. A small γ describes a
9The upper bound on γ is needed for the second order conditions of the profit maximization.
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case where the shopping space is concentrated so that the average travel cost to access cash
is low. In this case, consumers make many withdrawals but do not attach a high value to an
additional ATM. When γ is high, the shopping space is spread out and it is more costly to
reach cash. Cardholders make fewer withdrawals and each additional ATM is more valued.
Recall that ATMs and cardholders are uniformly located in the shopping space. As fi, sj
are equal to zero, cardholders withdraw cash at the closest ATM. With probability ni/n the
ATM belongs to bank i so that the individual demand for domestic withdrawals is α(ni/n)n
γ
and the individual demand for foreign withdrawals is equal to α(nj/n)n
γ.
Introducing a usage fee of one euro increases the number of domestic withdrawals by β′
and decreases the number of foreign withdrawals by β. Our demand specification reflects
the existence of a substitution effect that can be measured by the ratio β′/β < 1. For
tractability, we assume that this ratio does not depend on the ATM market shares. Note
that the linearity of demand functions guarantees the finiteness of demands when fees tend
to zero. This last property is necessary to compare the three pricing regimes.
In order to obtain a network size lower than one under the different regimes, we need a
second assumption:
Assumption 2. c >>
α2(3 + γ)
12(β − β′) .
Competition and profits
We deal with cases where the market is entirely covered. Let δ denote the distance
between bank 1 and the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing services from bank
1 or 2:
v1 − tδ − p1 = v2 − t(1− δ)− p2 (5)
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Bank i’s market share of deposits is
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj) (6)
Note that D1 +D2 = 1. The profit of bank i is
pii = (pi − cb)Di + (a+ si)qfj (1−Di) + (fi − a)qfi Di − cni. (7)
The term (pi−cb)Di is the net revenue from providing accounts. The term (a+si)qfj (1−Di)
corresponds to the revenues coming from the foreign withdrawals made by the cardholders
of bank j. The term (fi − a)qfi Di corresponds to the net revenues coming from foreign
withdrawals made by cardholders of bank i. The term cni corresponds to the total cost of
deploying and operating ATMs.
Timing of the game
Stage one: banks choose the interchange fee a jointly.
Stage two: banks simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the number of ATMs
they deploy, n1 and n2, and the fees, p1, f1,s1 and p2, f2, s2.
Stage three: each consumer chooses the bank that provides him with the highest posi-
tive surplus.
Stage four: consumers make withdrawals in the shopping space.
We deal with three different regimes. Under all regimes, consumers pay the account fee
pi. Under regime one, there is no ATM usage fee f1 = f2 = s1 = s2 = 0. Under regime two,
there are foreign fees but no surcharge, s1 = s2 = 0 and under regime three, foreign fees and
surcharges are allowed.
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Resolution
We look for the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the model for a given interchange fee.
We write the four first order conditions of the complete maximization problem:

∂pii
∂ni
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂ni
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di + (a+ si)
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di)− c = 0 (i)
∂pii
∂pi
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂pi
+Di = 0 (ii)
∂pii
∂fi
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂fi
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di + q
f
i Di = 0 (iii)
∂pii
∂si
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂si
+
(
(a+ si)
∂qfj
∂si
+ qfj
)
(1−Di) = 0 (iv)
(8)
with p˜i =
(
pi − cb − (a− fi)qfi − (a+ si)qfj
)
.
In each expression, the variation of the relevant decision variable has two effects on pii:
one through the demand for deposits faced by bank i and the other through the demands
for withdrawals. Note that term p˜i corresponds to the net revenue per additional depositor.
We now detail the effects more precisely for each regime.
2 Regime one: ATM usage fees are prohibited
We take f1 = f2 = s1 = s2 = 0: the account fee is the only available tool to charge consumers.
As withdrawals are free, all machines are equivalent for cardholders and they withdraw cash
regardless of the ATM owner.
2.1 The equilibrium for a given interchange fee
We consider a given interchange fee a. To generate a network size smaller than one we assume
that a is smaller than 2c/α. We characterize a Nash equilibrium {n∗1(a), p∗1(a), n∗2(a), p∗2(a)}
where all the market is covered (D1 + D2 = 1). Only conditions (8)(i) and (8)(ii) are
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relevant. It is convenient to start with the determination of the account fee. As all ATMs are
equivalent for cardholders, cardholders obtain the same net variable surplus from consuming
withdrawals whatever their home bank is: v1 = v2 for any n1 and n2. Hence we have
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(pj − pi) (9)
Using (8)(ii) and the symmetric condition on bank j, we get
p∗i (a) = t+ cb + aq
f
i (a) + aq
f
j (a) (10)
The equilibrium account fee is the sum of the differentiation parameter plus the total mar-
ginal cost for bank i of accepting a cardholder. This total marginal cost is composed of three
parts: cb is a marginal cost of basic services. The term aq
f
i corresponds to the interchange
fees that bank i will have to pay for the qfi foreign withdrawals of this cardholder. The
term aqfj can be interpreted as an opportunity cost: if the cardholder chose to become a
cardholder of bank j, he would make aqfj foreign withdrawals at bank i’s ATMs and bank
i would receive aqfj . Hence, by accepting the customer, bank 1 loses aq
f
j , which appears in
the equilibrium account fee pi.
Let us consider the deployment problem by rewriting expression (8)(i) as
t
δDi
δni
+ a
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (−a)
(
∂qfi
∂ni
)
Di = c
(A1) (B1) (C1)
(11)
Solving (11) with respect to ni gives the deployment reaction function. Let us examine the
three terms which measure the three effects of deploying an extra ATM on bank i’s profits.
• Term A1. As there is no ATM usage fee, all cardholders benefit the same way from
this extra ATM and bank i does not attract new cardholders thus its deposit market
share remains unchanged: ∂Di/∂ni = 0.
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• Term B1. The cardholders of bank j make more foreign withdrawals (∂qfj /∂ni > 0).
Consequently bank i receives more interchange fees.
• Term C1. The cardholders of bank i make less foreign withdrawals (∂qfi /∂ni < 0) and
less interchange fees must be paid to bank j.
To sum up: under regime one, a bank does not deploy ATMs to attract new depositors
but rather to process withdrawals made by its competitor’s cardholders and limit the foreign
withdrawals made by its own cardholders. Associating condition (11) with the symmetric
condition on bank j yields the total network size under regime one as a function of a:
n∗(a) =
(αa
2c
) 1
1−γ
(12)
At equilibrium n∗1(a) = n
∗
2(a) = n
∗(a)/2. The total ATM network size is increasing in a.
A higher interchange fee increases each bank’s incentives to open ATMs in order to attract
withdrawals from its own depositors and from non customers. As we have assumed that
a < 2c/α, the network size is decreasing in γ. A wider shopping space means that cardholders
incur a higher average travel cost to reach an ATM so that they make less withdrawals (for
any given network size). Consequently banks’ competition to process withdrawals is less
intense and the equilibrium network size is smaller. From expressions (3) and (4) we have
qd∗1 (a) = q
f∗
1 (a) = q
d∗
2 (a) = q
f∗
2 (a) = αn
∗γ(a)/2
Interestingly, the total profit can be rewritten as
pi∗i (a) =
t
2
+ aqf∗j (a)− c
n∗(a)
2
(13)
At equilibrium, the interchange outflows per cardholder of bank i, aqfi , are entirely recovered
through the account fee pi. Consequently aq
f
i does not appear in profit.
For this equilibrium to exist, we must verify two extra conditions:
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(i) For the market to be covered, the surplus of the consumer who is indifferent between
the two banks cannot be negative:
vb − t
2
+ ui
(
n∗i (a), n
∗
j(a), q
d∗
i (a), q
f∗
i (a)
)
− p∗i (a) ≥ 0 (14)
In appendix 2, we show that the previous condition is verified for all a smaller than a∗,
where a∗ is the unique positive interchange fee verifying condition (14) with equality. The
interchange fee a∗ permits to extract all the surplus of the indifferent consumer and it appears
in figure 1. It is not possible to characterize a∗ explicitly. However, we will be able to compare
the profits in the different regimes.
(ii) The second order conditions must hold. We show that it is indeed the case if vb − cb
is “not too large” in the sense defined precisely in appendix 3.
2.2 The effect of the interchange fee on equilibrium profits
For any a ≤ a∗, the equilibrium profit of bank i is
pi∗i (a) =
t
2
+
( αa
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
(15)
Proposition 1 Under regime one, equilibrium profits are monotonically increasing in a on
[0, a∗]. By setting a = a∗ banks extract all the surplus of the indifferent consumer.
To understand proposition 1, note that raising the interchange fee has two opposite
effects on profits (characterized in expression (13)): first, there is a more intense competition
to attract domestic and foreign withdrawals. Hence, banks deploy more ATMs and the
deployment costs increase. Second, the revenues from interchange inflows aqfj increase. The
effect on interchange inflows outweighs the effect on deployment costs so that profits increase.
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Proposition 1 shows that setting the interchange fee jointly allows banks to collude and
to extract consumers surplus. As profits are monotonically increasing in a, collusion is only
limited by the participation constraint of the marginal consumer. The account fee is a lump
sum. By raising the interchange fee, the lump sum increases, consumers’ surplus decreases
till the participation constraint of the marginal consumer binds.
There could exist equilibria for interchange fees above a∗ yielding higher equilibrium
profits. However we do not need to characterize these equilibria for our subsequent analysis.10
3 Regime two: surcharges are prohibited
We take s1 = s2 = 0. Each bank charges its cardholders the two-part tariff pi + fiq
f
i .
3.1 The equilibrium for a given interchange fee
We consider a given interchange fee smaller than 4c/α(3 + γ). We characterize a symmetric
Nash equilibrium {n∗1ff (a), p∗1ff (a), n∗2ff (a), p∗2ff (a), f∗1 , f∗2}. It is convenient to start with the
determination of the foreign fee. In appendix 4, we show that in equilibrium, the foreign fee
set by bank i is equal to the marginal cost of a foreign withdrawal, that is, to the interchange
fee:
f ∗i = a (16)
Doing so, bank imaximizes its cardholders’ surplus and use the fixed account fee pi to recover
a part of this surplus in a manner compatible with the competitive intensity.
Let us determine the equilibrium account fee. Using expressions (8)(i), (16) and the fact
that Di = 1/2 at the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:
10See Donze & Dubec (2006) for an exemple of derivation of such equilibria above a∗ with less general
demands for withdrawals.
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p∗i,ff (a) = t+ cb + aq
f∗
j,ff (a) (17)
The interpretation of the equilibrium account fee under regime 2 is nearly the same as under
regime 1 except that the account fee only recoups the opportunity cost of accepting an extra
depositor, aqfj . The second part of the marginal cost of affiliation, aq
f
i , is now recovered
through the foreign fee revenues fiq
f
i
Let us turn to the deployment problem of banks. Using (17), expression (8)(ii) can be
rewritten:
t
δDi
δni
+ a
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di = c
(A2) (B2) (C2)
(18)
The LHS of expression (18) shows the effect of deploying an extra ATM on bank i’s revenue.
Let us examine the three terms (A2), (B2) and (C2) to explain the determinants of ATM
deployment under regime two:
• We show in appendix 5 that at the symmetric equilibrium δDi/δni = (α/2t)anγ−1:
term (A2) is positive and consequently higher than term (A1) in expression (11). As
consumers pay for foreign withdrawals, they take into account the ATM market shares
when they decide where to open an account: consumers prefer a bank with a larger
network because they can make less costly foreign withdrawals. Hence, the deployment
of an extra ATM by bank i makes this bank more attractive and increases its deposit
market share (δDi/δni > 0) and its revenues. In some sense, the existence of foreign
fees creates a differentiation between the ATM networks of the two banks. For a given
interchange fee, this differentiation effect of foreign fees makes banks deploy more
ATMs than under regime one.
• Term (B2) is positive and equal to term (B1) of expression (11). As under regime one,
deploying an extra ATM increases the interchange inflows of bank i.
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• Term (C2) is smaller than term (C1) of expression (11). This is the interchange recovery
effect of introducing foreign fees: since the foreign fee is equal to the interchange fee, the
foreign withdrawals of bank i’s cardholders become costless for this bank. Consequently
limiting its cardholders’ foreign withdrawals is no more a reason to deploy ATMs. This
interchange recovery effect of foreign fees makes banks deploy fewer ATMs than under
regime one.
Hence under regime two, banks deploy ATMs both to attract new depositors and generate
interchange inflows. Note that the differentiation effect and the interchange recovery effect
on deployment are opposite. In appendix 5, we show using expressions (16) and (18) that
the total number of ATMs deployed under regime two for a given interchange fee is
n∗ff (a) =
(
α(3 + γ)a
4c
) 1
1−γ
(19)
The number of ATMs deployed under regime two is increasing in the interchange fee, decreas-
ing in the deployment cost, and decreasing in γ. Comparing expressions (12) and (19) shows
that in our framework, banks deploy more ATMs under regime two than under regime one
for a given interchange fee: the differentiation effect of foreign fees outweighs the interchange
recovery effect. From expressions (3), (4), and (16), we have
qd∗1ff (a) = q
d∗
2ff (a) = αn
∗γ
ff (a)/2 + β
′a (20)
and
qf∗1ff (a) = q
f∗
2ff (a) = αn
∗γ
ff (a)/2− βa (21)
The equilibrium profit can be written as
pi∗i,ff (a) =
t
2
+ aqf∗j,ff (a)− c
n∗ff (a)
2
(22)
This expression is similar to expression (13) we obtained under regime one. However, the
interchange outflows per cardholder of bank i, aqfi , are now entirely recovered through the
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foreign fee fi and no more through the account fee pi. Using (19), (21) and (22), we can
write the equilibrium profit of bank i as a function of a:
pi∗i,ff (a) =
t
2
+
1− γ
8
(
3 + γ
4
) γ
1−γ
α
1
1−γ
a
1
1−γ
c
γ
1−γ
− βa2 (23)
We verify the second order conditions of maximization in appendix 6.
We compare network sizes, banks profits and consumers’ surpluses under regime one
and two for a given interchange fee. To compare consumers’ surplus across regimes, we
consider the surplus of the indifferent consumer which we denote by w˜(a). At the symmetric
equilibrium: w˜(a) = vb − t2 + v1(a)− p1(a).
Proposition 2 For any given interchange fee a ∈]0, a∗], switching from regime one to regime
two yields
(i) a larger network: n∗ff (a) > n
∗(a)
(ii) higher profits for both banks: pi∗i,ff (a) < pi
∗
i (a), i = 1, 2.
(iii) a higher consumers’ surplus: w˜∗(a) < w˜∗ff (a).
Proof: appendix 7.
As noted before, for a given interchange fee, banks deploy more ATMs under regime
two because of the differentiation effect of foreign fees. The increase in deployment costs
outweighs the change in revenues so that banks profits are lower under regime two.11 Fur-
thermore, consumers are better off under regime two. This is for two reasons: first, as the
network size is larger, accessing to cash is easier; second, consumers prefer to pay for their
foreign withdrawals through the usage fees of regime two rather than through the lump sum
of regime one: in the latter case, cardholders consume (and pay for) “too many” foreign
withdrawals.
11Note that the effect of introducing foreign fees on the demand for foreign withdrawals and hence on
revenues is ambiguous since more ATMs are available at a higher usage fee.
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3.2 The effect of the interchange fee on equilibrium profits
Contrary to what happens under regime one, pi∗i,ff (a) has a unique maximum, characterized
by
a∗ff =
(
α(3 + γ)γ
24−2γβ1−γcγ
) 1
1−2γ
(24)
The profit pi∗i,ff (a) is increasing in a up to the point a
∗
ff . To understand why, let us consider
the effect of increasing the interchange fee in expression (22). In a first time, profits follow
the increase in revenues per foreign withdrawals, a, and in a second time, the declining
demand for foreign withdrawals and the ever increasing deployment costs make profits fall.
In appendix 7, we verify that when a = a∗ff , the net surplus w˜
∗
ff of the indifferent
consumer is positive. We sum up the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under regime two, equilibrium profits are monotonically increasing in a on
[0, a∗ff ] and decreasing thereafter. When a = a
∗
ff , banks leave a positive surplus to the
indifferent consumer.
As under regime one, banks can collude by setting the interchange fee jointly. Never-
theless, their ability to extract consumers surplus by raising the interchange fee is reduced
because of the existence of foreign fees: contrary to regime one, cardholders react to an
increase of the interchange fee (and hence of the foreign fee) by adjusting their demand for
foreign withdrawals downward in order to pay less to their bank.
The size of the network for the profit-maximizing interchange fee is
n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
(
α2(3 + γ)
64βc
) 11−2γ
(25)
Note that assumption 2 guarantees that n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) is lower than one. The associated individual
profit is
pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
(26)
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We will compare the profits for the profit-maximizing interchange fees across the three
regimes subsequently.
4 Regime three: the case with foreign fees and sur-
charges
Under regime three, each bank i charges its own cardholders the two-part tariff pi+fiq
f
i and
charges non-customers the linear tariff siq
f
j .
4.1 The equilibrium for a given interchange fee
As in regime two, banks maximize their cardholders surplus by setting the foreign fee equal
to the marginal cost of a foreign withdrawal (f ∗i = a) and extract it back through the account
fee pi. This is proved in appendix 3. Using expression (8)(ii) and the fact that Di = 1/2 at
the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium account fee of bank i:
p∗i,sur(a) = t+ cb + (a+ s
∗
i (a))q
f∗
j,sur(a) (27)
The opportunity cost of accepting an additional cardholder must now take into account the
surcharges siq
f
j that this cardholder would pay to bank i if he had chosen bank j. As under
regime two, the interchange outflows per cardholder, aqfi , are recovered through the foreign
fees revenues fiq
f
i and not through the account fee pi.
At the symmetric equilibrium, expression (8)(i) can be written as
t
δDi
δni
+ (a+ si)
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di = c
(A3) (B3) (C3)
(28)
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This expression shows that the qualitative reasons to deploy ATMs are the same as under
regime 2. First each bank deploys ATMs in order to increase its deposit market share: term
(A3) is positive. We show in appendix 8 that at the symmetric equilibrium δDi/δni =
(α/2t)(a + si)n
γ−1. Second, each bank wants to increase its revenues from the interchange
inflows it perceives: term (B3) is positive. As under regime two, the third term is null
at equilibrium. In fact expression (28) is the same as expression (18), except that a is
replaced by a + si: for a given level of interchange fee and a positive surcharge si, bank
i has more incentives to open ATMs than under regime two. The surcharge adds to the
interchange fee and permits double marginalization: the revenue per foreign withdrawal is
higher. Consequently, surcharging boosts ATM deployment.
Let us now examine the factors determining the level of the surcharge. For that, we have
to interpret expression (8)(iv). Using (27), expression (8)(iv) can be written as
t
∂Di
∂si
+
(
(a+ si)
∂qfj
∂si
+ qfj
)
(1−Di) = 0 (29)
The LHS of expression (29) measures the effect of a marginal increase of si on bank i’s profit.
• The first term of the LHS is positive and equal to 1
2
qfj (see appendix 9): a higher
surcharge si increases the price per foreign withdrawal for the cardholders of bank j.
This has a negative effect on the surplus derived from the affiliation to bank j and bank
i becomes more attractive for depositors. Hence, a higher surcharge permits bank i
to enlarge its deposit market share and increase its profit. This effect appears in the
literature as the “depositor-stealing motive” for surcharges (see McAndrews (1998))
• Bank i has also to consider the effect of rising the surcharge on the revenue from non
customers measured by the second term of expression (29). A higher surcharge yields
higher revenues per foreign withdrawal but non customers use less frequently bank i’s
machines.
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Using the fact that f ∗i = a, expressions (28), (29), and symmetry, we obtain

s∗1(a) = s
∗
2(a) = s
∗(a) = αn∗γ(a)/3β − a
n∗(a) =
(
α(3 + γ)(a+ s∗(a))
4c
) 1
1−γ
The two previous equations show that there is a reinforcement effect between the surcharge
level and the network size: for a given level of a, double marginalization induces a bigger
ATM network than under regime two. Demands for foreign withdrawals shift upward and
banks can set higher surcharges. In turn the higher surcharges increase the double margin,
and so on. Solving the previous system we have
n∗sur =
(
α2(3 + γ)
12βc
) 1
1−2γ
(30)
We verify the second order conditions of maximization in appendix 10.
4.2 The neutrality of the interchange fee
When foreign fees and surcharges are permitted the interchange fee affects neither the equi-
librium number of ATMs, n∗sur, nor the total price paid by cardholders for foreign withdrawal,
f ∗ + s∗ = αn∗γsur/3β. Banks’ profits are therefore independent from a:
pi∗sur =
t
2
− 2 4γ−31−2γ 3 2γ−21−2γ (5 + 3γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
(31)
To understand the neutrality of the interchange fee, consider the situation where bank i
obtains interchange revenues equal to a + s∗i for each withdrawal made by a cardholder of
bank j, and bank j receives f ∗j −a for each foreign withdrawals made by its own cardholders.
Cardholders of bank j pay f ∗j +s
∗
i per foreign withdrawal. Suppose now that the interchange
fee is increased by ∆a. Banks can preserve the equilibrium payoffs and cardholders’ demands
are unchanged if bank i reduces its surcharge by ∆a while bank j increases its foreign fee
by ∆a. The total usage fee paid by bank j’s cardholder is still equal to f ∗j + s
∗
i , the number
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of foreign withdrawals and banks’ revenues are unchanged. Since the equilibrium network
size and the total usage fee are unaffected by the interchange fee, consumers’ welfare is also
independent from a.12
We sum up the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When foreign fees and surcharges are allowed, the interchange fee is neutral
in the following sense: (i) its level does not affect the equilibrium deployment of ATM nor
banks’ equilibrium profits. (ii) its level does not affect consumers’ welfare.
The main consequence of this result is that under regime three the interchange fee cannot
be a collusive tool for banks anymore. Interestingly, bank i’s accounting net revenue per ATM
is equal to
(a+ s∗i )q
f∗
j,sur(a)D
∗
j
n∗i,sur(a)
− c = −7 + 3γ
9 + 3γ
c
which is negative. As noted before, this prediction is consistent with empirical observations
that in the USA, ATMs operated by banks lose money on average (see footnote 6).
5 Comparison of the three pricing regimes
In this section, we compare banks’ profits and consumers’ surplus across the three regimes
when banks choose the interchange fee to maximize their joint profits. We also study the
consequences of replacing the interchange system by a direct charging scheme.
5.1 Comparison of profits and consumers’ surplus
Under regime one, individual profits pi∗(a) are monotonically increasing in the interchange
fee up to a∗, where a∗ is defined by condition (14) verified with equality. Consequently,
12This intuitive argument explaining neutrality was first developped by Salop (1990).
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banks never choose an interchange fee lower than a∗ and the individual profits cannot be
lower than pi∗(a∗). There could exist equilibria for interchange fees above a∗ yielding higher
equilibrium profits. However it will be sufficient to work with the profits associated to the
type of equilibrium we have described to compare the three regimes. Under regime two,
banks choose a∗ff defined by (24) to maximize their joint profits. Each bank obtain pi
∗
ff (a
∗
ff )
defined by (25). Under regime three the choice of the interchange fee is irrelevant and each
bank obtains pi∗sur defined by (31).
Proposition 5 Suppose that under each regime banks jointly set the interchange fee at the
level that maximizes their joint profits, then
(i) the network is larger under regime three than under regime two: n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) < n
∗
sur;
(ii) banks prefer regime one to regime two and regime two to regime three:
pi∗(a∗) > pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) > pi
∗
sur;
(iii) there exists a value γ(β′/β) above which consumers prefer regime three to regime
two:
∀γ < γ(β′
β
), w˜∗ff (a
∗
ff ) > w˜
∗
sur > w˜
∗(a∗) = 0;
∀γ > γ(β′
β
), w˜∗sur > w˜
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ) > w˜
∗(a∗) = 0.
where γ(β′/β) = 1
2
(
1− ln 16
3
/ ln(
99+29β
′
β
8+16β
′
β
)
)
Proof: appendix 11.
γ(β′/β) is represented in figure 2.
When banks choose the profit-maximizing interchange fee, fewer ATMs are deployed un-
der regime two than under regime three. This is because the revenue per foreign withdrawal
a∗ff under regime two is lower than the revenue with surcharges, a
∗
ff + s
∗(a∗ff ). Regime three
is the worst for banks because they incur very high deployment cost compared to regime two
and they cannot use the interchange fee to relax price competition on the deposit market.
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For a given substitution rate β′/β, consumers prefer regime three to regime two for
sufficiently high values of the dispersion parameter γ. In this case, travel costs to withdraw
cash are higher ceteris paribus and consumers appreciate the large network of regime three
even if they have to pay higher usage fees per foreign withdrawal. When the shopping space
is more concentrated consumers prefer the smaller and less expensive network of regime two.
Interestingly, this prediction is consistent with the empirical work of Knittel and Stango
(2004) who find that after the introduction of surcharging in 1996 in the USA, consumers’
welfare increased in high travel cost counties while it decreased in low travel cost counties.
Potentially, regime one is the most profitable for banks and the worst for consumers be-
cause the collusive power of the interchange fee is only limited by the participation constraint
of the marginal consumer. By banning usage fees banks can maximize consumers’ gross sur-
plus and extract it back through the account fee. Under regime two, banks’ individual
objectives do not coincide with the industry objectives: at equilibrium banks independently
set the foreign fee equal to the interchange fee to maximize their individual profits while it
would be better for them to set it equal to zero and increase the account fee.
5.2 Direct charging
The ATMmarkets in Australia and South Africa work under a regime close to our regime two,
with interchange fees and foreign fees but no surcharges. Recently, the Australian and the
South African regulation authorities have proposed to use a “direct charging model” whereby
the interchange fee applicable to each foreign transaction would be removed and ATM owners
would be free to set their own fee for foreign ATM transactions (see Reserve Bank of Australia
& the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) ; Competition Commission
of South Africa (2007)). According to its proponents, there are two main objectives of the
reform. First, removing the interchange system limits banks’ possibility to collude. The
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second objective is to favor price competition on ATM fees between ATM deployers. The
resulting price flexibility is to be opposed to the stickiness of interchange fees. One can study
the consequences of such a regulation scheme in our model.
Proposition 6 The “direct charging model” is equivalent to regime three.
Proof: setting a = f1 = f2 = 0 in the system of equations (8) yields the solution
characterized by (30).
Hence, the model predicts that switching from regime two to direct charging increases
consumers’ welfare if travel costs are sufficiently high. However direct charging hurts banks:
because of the deposit stealing effect, surcharges are set above the level that would maximize
the revenue per ATM, which in turn favors the ATM deployment, higher surcharges and so on.
The advocates of the direct charging scheme forget this interaction between the withdrawal
market and the deposit market.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a tractable model to study the effect of ATM pricing on welfare in which
the relationships between the deposit market and the withdrawal market are highlighted.
We have shown that increasing the number of usage fees make ATM networks more differen-
tiated which provide banks with more incentives to deploy ATMs. The potential increase in
revenues from adding usage fees is not sufficient to cover the additional deployment costs and
the model predicts that banks’ profits diminish when one switches from regime one to two
and from regime two to three. Regime three is specially bad for banks since the neutrality
of the interchange fee is further added to the large ATM deployment.
From the regulator’s perspective, our analysis shows the importance of the travel costs
to reach cash within the shopping space when deciding to ban surcharges or not: consumers
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prefer regime three to regime two only when they incur high travel costs as it is the case
when the shopping space is spread out. The model also predicts that direct charging induces
an intense competition to attract both depositors and withdrawals. This leads banks to
deploy a large number of ATMs and their profits are adversely affected.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Surplus from consuming withdrawals
We assume that the variable gross surplus from consuming withdrawals takes the follow-
ing quadratic shape:
ui =
1
β2 − β′2
[
(αβ
ni
n
nγ + αβ′
nj
n
nγ)qdi −
β
2
(qdi )
2 + (αβ
nj
n
nγ + αβ′
ni
n
nγ)qfi −
β
2
(qfi )
2 − β′qdi qfi
]
(32)
Writing ∂vi/∂q
d
i = 0 and ∂vi/∂q
f
i = 0 and inverting the system yields the individual demands
for withdrawals.
Using expressions (2), (32), (3) and (4) we get the optimized expression of the net surplus
from consuming withdrawals,
vi = ui − (fi + sj)qfi (33)
=
α2
2(β − β′)
[
n2in
2γ−2 + n2jn
2γ−2]+ β
2
(fi + sj)
2 − α(fi + sj)njnγ−1
Appendix 2. Characterization of a∗ under regime 1
Under regime one, the two last terms of expression (33) are equal to zero. By setting
n∗i (a) = n
∗
j(a) = n
∗(a)/2 we obtain
v1 = v2 =
α2n∗2γ(a)
4(β − β′) (34)
Condition (14) can be rewritten with equality under the following shape:
vb +
α2n∗
2γ
(a)
4(β − β′) −
t
2
− p∗1(a) = 0
or using expressions (10) and(12),
vb − cb − 3t
2
+
αa
2γ
1−γ
(2c/α)
γ
1−γ
(
α
4(β − β′)(2c/α) γ1−γ
− a 1−2γ1−γ
)
= 0 (35)
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The LHS of expression (35) is the function represented in figure 1 and the equation has a
unique positive solution, a∗.
It must be the case that the interchange fee a∗ does not induce a network n∗(a∗) larger
than one. In other words, we must have
vb +
α2
4(β − β′) −
t
2
− p∗1(a) < 0 for a = 2c/α
which can be rewritten
vb − cb < 3t
2
+ 2c− α
2
4(β − β′) (36)
The expression is not very demanding since under assumption 2, we can verify that
2c− α2/4(β − β′) > c. Generally, it is not possible to determine a∗ explicitly. However, by
setting vb − cb − 3t/2 = 0, we obtain the minimum interchange fee that we denote by a∗min.
We have
a∗min =
(
α
22−γ(β − β′)1−γcγ
) 1
1−2γ
(37)
The associated network size is
n∗(a∗min) =
(
α2
8(β − β′)c
) 1
1−2γ
(38)
Appendix 3. The Hessian matrix of the profit function under regime 1
The Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the profit function must be negative definite.
The matrix is
H =
 ∂2pii/∂n2i ∂2pii/∂ni∂pi
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i
 =
(eq)
 αa(γ − 1) α a2tγnγ−1
α
a
2t
γnγ−1 −1/t
 (39)
We obtain Det(H11) = αa(γ − 1) < 0. Furthermore Det(H) = αa(1 − γ)nγ−2/t −
α2a2γ2n2γ−2/4t2. Using the fact that n∗(a) = (αa/2c)
1
1−γ we get Det(H) = 2c(1 − γ)/tn −
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c2γ2/t2. Clearly Det(H) > 0 if γ = 0. Suppose γ > 0, Det(H) > 0 is equivalent to
n∗(a) < 2(1− γ)t/cγ2 or equivalently,
a <
2c
α
(
2(1− γ)t
cγ2
)1−γ ≡ amax
The latter condition is verified if a∗ < amax, where a∗ is the solution of (35). This last
inequality can be rewritten
vb − cb < 3t
2
+
2(1− γ)t
γ2
− α
2
4(β − β′)(
2(1− γ)t
cγ2
)2γ (40)
One can verify that the RHS of expression (40) is decreasing with γ. When γ → 0, the
RHS of expression (40) is infinite. When γ = 1/2, the RHS is close to 11t/2 because
assumption 2 guarantees that α
2
4c(β−β′) is small. Conditions (36) and (40) must hold together
with assumption 1.
Appendix 4. Proof that fi = a under regimes 2 and 3
Under regimes 2 and 3, bank i’s demand for deposits is
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj)
Hence
∂Di
∂pi
= − 1
2t
Let us calculate the effect of fi on bank i’s deposit market share, Di. We have
∂Di
∂fi
=
1
2t
∂vi
∂fi
Using (33), we obtain
∂vi
∂fi
=
∂ui
∂qfi
∂qfi
∂fi
− qfi − (fi + sj)
∂qfi
∂fi
As ∂vi/∂q
f
i = 0, we have ∂ui/∂q
f
i = fi + sj so that ∂vi/∂fi = −qfi . Finally
∂Di
∂fi
= − 1
2t
qfi (41)
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Condition (8)(ii) can be rewritten:
pi − cb − (a− fi)qfi − (a+ si)qfj = −Di/
∂Di
∂pi
= 2tDi
Plugging this result in condition (8)(iii), we obtain
2tDi
∂Di
∂fi
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di + q
f
i Di = 0
Using (41), we have
(fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di = 0
hence fi = a for any Di.
Appendix 5. Determination of the equilibrium network size under regime 2.
Using expressions (6) and (33), we have
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
α
2t
(fj
(
nγ−1 + (γ − 1)ninγ−2
)− fi(γ − 1)njnγ−2) (42)
At the symmetric equilibrium we have fi = fj = a and ni = nj. Hence,
∂Di
∂ni
=
α
2t
anγ−1 (43)
Using (16) and (43), we can rewrite expression (18) as
α
2
anγ−1 +
α(1 + γ)
4
anγ−1 − c = 0
which yields expression (19).
Appendix 6. The Hessian matrix of the profit function under regime 2
Let us calculate the Hessian matrix at (n∗ff (a), p
∗
ff (a), f
∗ = a). We have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂fi
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂fi
∂2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂fi∂pi ∂
2pii/∂f
2
i

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or
H =

−A−B/t c/t cqf∗i (a)/t
c/t −1/t −qf∗i (a)/t
cqf∗i (a)/t −qf∗i (a)/t −β/2− qf∗i (a)2/t

with A = c
n∗ff (a)
(1−γ)(γ+6)
3+γ
> 0 and B = 8c2 1+γ
(3+γ)2
> 0. A and B do not depend on t.
Det(H11) = −A−B/t is negative.
Det(H22) = (tA+B − c2)/t2 is positive for t sufficiently large.
Det(H) = −0.5β(tA+B − c2)/t2 is negative for t sufficiently large.
Appendix 7. Comparison of pi∗(a) and pi∗ff (a). Comparison of w
∗
ff (a) and w
∗(a)
We compare pi∗(a) and pi∗ff (a). We express everything in n
∗(a). We have n∗ff (a) = λn
∗(a)
with
λ =
(
3 + γ
2
) 1
1−γ
> 1
and a = 2cn∗1−γ(a)/α. Hence,
pi∗(a) = α
a
2
n∗γ(a)− c
2
n∗(a) =
c
2
n∗(a)
Furthermore,
pi∗ff (a) = α
a
2
n∗γff (a)− βa2 −
c
2
n∗ff (a) = α
a
2
λγn∗γ(a)− βa2 − c
2
λn∗(a)
= (2λγ − λ) c
2
n∗(a)− βa2 =
(
3 + γ
2
) γ
1−γ
(
1− γ
2
)
c
2
n∗(a)− βa2
As
(
3+γ
2
) γ
1−γ
(
1−γ
2
)
< 2 ∗ 1
2
= 1, we have pi∗(a) > pi∗ff (a).
We calculate the sign of w∗ff (a)− w∗(a):
w∗ff (a)− w∗(a) =
(
α2n∗2γff (a)
4(β − β′) +
3β
2
a2 − αan∗γff (a)
)
−
(
α2n∗2γ(a)
4(β − β′) − αan
∗γ(a)
)
(44)
Note first that w∗ff (a) − w∗(a) > 0 for γ = 0. Let us take γ > 0. We express everything
in n∗(a). Using (12) one can write a = 2cn∗1−γ(a)/α. Furthermore n∗ff (a) = λn
∗(a) with
34
λ =
(
3+γ
2
) 1
1−γ > 1. Hence dropping (a), (44) becomes
w∗ff (a)− w∗(a) =
α2n∗2γ
4(β − β′)(λ
2γ − 1) + 6βc
2n∗2−2γ
α2
− 2(λγ − 1)cn∗
= n∗
(
α2n∗2γ−1
4(β − β′)(λ
2γ − 1) + 6βc
2n∗1−2γ
α2
− 2(λγ − 1)c
)
However
argmin
n
(
α2n2γ−1
4(β − β′)(λ
2γ − 1) + 6βc
2n1−2γ
α2
− 2(λγ − 1)c
)
=(√
6
β
β − β′ (λ
2γ − 1)−
√
4(λγ − 1)2
)
c
which is positive because 6 β
β−β′ (λ
2γ − 1) > 6(λ2γ − 1) > 4(λγ − 1)2 for any λ > 1. Hence
w∗ff − w∗ > 0 for any n > 0, that is for any a > 0.
Under regime 2, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is
w∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
29α2
512β
)
(n∗ff )
2γ > 0
Appendix 8. Effect of ni on bank i’s deposit market share, under regime 3.
Using expressions (6) and (33), we have
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
α
2t
((si + fj)
(
nγ−1 + (γ − 1)ninγ−2
)− (sj + fi)(γ − 1)njnγ−2) (45)
For fi = fj = a, ni = nj and si = sj = s we obtain
∂Di
∂ni
=
α
2t
(a+ s)nγ−1
Appendix 9. Effect of si on bank i’s deposit market share, under regime three
Under regime three, we have
∂Di
∂si
=
1
2t
qfj
Indeed using (6) and (2) one can write
∂Di
∂si
= − 1
2t
∂vj
∂si
= − 1
2t
(
∂uj
∂qfj
∂qfj
∂si
− qfj − (fj + si)
∂qfj
∂si
)
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However ∂uj/∂q
f
j = fj + si so that ∂vj/∂si = −qfj .
Appendix 10. Hessian matrix under regime 4
We show that the Hessian matrix at (n∗sur, p
∗
sur, f
∗, s∗) is negative definite when t is large
enough. We have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂fi ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂fi∂pi ∂
2pii/∂f
2
i ∂
2pii/∂fi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂si ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si ∂
2pii∂fi∂si ∂
2pii/∂s
2
i

or
H =

−A−B/t c/t cD/t E/t+ F
c/t −1/t −D/t 0
cD/t −D/t −β/2−D2/t 0
E/t+ F 0 0 −3β/2 +D2/t

with A = c
n∗sur
(1−γ)(γ+6)
3+γ
> 0, B = 8c2 1+γ
(3+γ)2
> 0, D = α(n∗sur)
γ/6 > 0, E = α2 1−γ
72β
(n∗sur)
3γ−1 >
0 and F = αγ+1
2
(n∗sur)
γ−1 > 0
Det(H11) = −A−B/t < 0
Det(H22) = (tA+B − c2)/t2 is positive for t sufficiently large.
Det(H33) = −0.5β(tA+B − c2)/t2 is negative for t sufficiently large.
Det(H44) = 0.25β [t
2(3Aβ − 2F 2)− 2AtD2 + 3Bβt− 2BD2 − 3c2βt+ 2c2D2 − 2E2 − 4EFt] /t3
is positive when t is large enough. Indeed γ <
√
129−9
6
' 0.393 guarantees that 3Aβ−2F 2 > 0.
Appendix 11: Comparison of pi∗(a∗) and pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ). Comparison of w˜
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ) and w˜
∗
sur.
Let us consider particular values of the parameters: v0b , c
0
b and t
0 that satisfy v0b − c0b −
3t0/2 = 0. They yield the minimum interchange fee a∗min that we obtained in appendix 2
36
(expression 37). According to expression (15), the associated profit under regime one is
pi∗(a∗min) =
t0
2
+
(
αa∗min
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
=
t0
2
+ 4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
Let us consider parameters vb, cb and t such that vb − cb − 3t/2 ≥ 0. The corresponding
interchange fee a∗ is higher than a∗min. The associated profit is
pi∗(a∗) =
t
2
+
(
αa∗
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
Under regime 2, according to expression (26), we have
pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
One can verify that
4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
> 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
Hence,
pi∗(a∗) =
t
2
+
(
αa∗
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
>
t
2
+
(
αa∗min
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
=
t
2
+ 4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
>
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
= pi∗ff (a
∗
ff )
QED
We compare the surplus of the indifferent consumer under regimes 2 et 3. We have
w˜∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
29α2
512β
)
(n∗ff )
2γ
and
w˜∗sur = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
α2
6β
)
(n∗sur)
2γ
As n∗sur = (
16
3
)
1
1−2γn∗ff (a
∗
ff ), writing w
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ) > w
∗
sur yields γ < γ(β
′/β).
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